@night 1803 access accessdata active directory admissibility ads aduc aim aix ajax alissa torres amcache analysis anjp anssi answer key antiforensics apfs appcompat appcompatflags applocker april fools argparse arman gungor arsenal artifact extractor attachments attacker tools austin automating automation awards aws azure azuread back to basics backstage base16 best finds beta bias bitcoin bitlocker blackbag blackberry enterprise server blackhat blacklight blade blanche lagny book book review brute force bsides bulk extractor c2 carved carving case ccdc cd burning ceic cfp challenge champlain chat logs Christmas Christmas eve chrome cit client info cloud forensics command line computer forensics computername conference schedule consulting contest cool tools. tips copy and paste coreanalytics cortana court approved credentials cryptocurrency ctf cti summit cut and paste cyberbox Daily Blog dbir deep freeze defcon defender ata deviceclasses dfa dfir dfir automation dfir exposed dfir in 120 seconds dfir indepth dfir review dfir summit dfir wizard dfrws dfvfs dingo stole my baby directories directory dirty file system disablelastaccess discount download dropbox dvd burning e01 elastic search elcomsoft elevated email recovery email searching emdmgmt Encyclopedia Forensica enfuse eric huber es eshandler esxi evalexperience event log event logs evidence execution exfat ext3 ext4 extended mapi external drives f-response factory access mode false positive fat fde firefox for408 for498 for500 for526 for668 forenisc toolkit forensic 4cast forensic lunch forensic soundness forensic tips fraud free fsutil ftk ftk 2 full disk encryption future gcfe gcp github go bag golden ticket google gsuite guardduty gui hackthebox hal pomeranz hashlib hfs honeypot honeypots how does it work how i use it how to howto IE10 imaging incident response indepth information theft infosec pro guide intern internetusername Interview ios ip theft iphone ir itunes encrypted backups jailbreak jeddah jessica hyde joe sylve journals json jump lists kali kape kevin stokes kibana knowledgec korman labs lance mueller last access last logon leanpub libtsk libvshadow linux linux-3g live systems lnk files log analysis log2timeline login logs london love notes lznt1 mac mac_apt macmini magnet magnet user summit mathias fuchs md viewer memorial day memory forensics metaspike mft mftecmd mhn microsoft milestones mimikatz missing features mlocate mobile devices mojave mount mtp multiboot usb mus mus 2019 mus2019 nccdc netanalysis netbios netflow new book new years eve new years resolutions nominations nosql notifications ntfs ntfsdisablelastaccessupdate nuc nw3c objectid offensive forensics office office 2016 office 365 oleg skilkin osx outlook outlook web access owa packetsled paladin path specification pdf perl persistence pfic plists posix powerforensics powerpoint powershell prefetch psexec py2exe pyewf pyinstaller python pytsk rallysecurity raw images rdp re-c re-creation testing reader project recipes recon recursive hashing recycle bin redteam regipy registry registry explorer registry recon regripper remote research reverse engineering rhel rootless runas sample images san diego SANS sans dfir summit saturday Saturday reading sbe sccm scrap files search server 2008 server 2008 r2 server 2012 server 2019 setmace setupapi sha1 shadowkit shadows shell items shellbags shimcache silv3rhorn skull canyon skype slow down smb solution solution saturday sop speed sponsors sqlite srum ssd stage 1 stories storport sunday funday swgde syscache system t2 takeout telemetry temporary files test kitchen thanksgiving threat intel timeline times timestamps timestomp timezone tool tool testing training transaction logs triage triforce truecrypt tsk tun naung tutorial typed paths typedpaths uac unc understanding unicorn unified logs unread usb usb detective usbstor user assist userassist usnjrnl validation vhd video video blog videopost vlive vmug vmware volatility vote vss web2.0 webcast webinar webmail weekend reading what are you missing what did they take what don't we know What I wish I knew whitfield windows windows 10 windows 2008 windows 7 windows forensics windows server winfe winfe lite wmi write head xboot xfs xways yarp yogesh zimmerman zone.identifier

Daily Blog #346: A quick note on Shellbag analysis in Windows 7/8

Hello Reader,
        If you are like me you love shellbags and use them on a regular basis to try to get some insight on what exists on external drives. One of the problems we run into though is that Shellbags stores full paths but not volume names or serial numbers so we cannot see from the entry what external device a recorded path was contained on from just that entry. We can do timeline analysis of devices plugged in, files accessed, drive letters assigned and the like to narrow down which device was plugged in but you are still sometimes left with multiple devices in play. I am going to go more in depth with this in a later series but I wanted to pass on a few tips.

NTFS v FAT entries

One of the easiest ways to tell the difference between drives requires that your sbag parser shows you the file record number and sequence number of the path it is pointing to. Sbag from TZWorks does this. If your tool is reporting this is becomes very easy to separate out the NTFS vs the FAT disks accessed as FAT does not record sequence numbers (its not part of its file system structure) so the sequence values will be null. 

NTFS v NTFS entries

A common thing we see is the same folder being copied to multiple drives, when this happens you can get seemingly duplicate entries in the shellbags. Look closer! The file record and sequence number will be unique between them allowing you to determine that they where contained on different drives.

Identifying the directory accessed

One of the questions I often get asked by clients is, did the drive they return contain the data they copied on to these external drives. Using the same file record and sequence number (or lack there of) we talked about above we can now match those accesses to each drive. I would not expect two drives to have the same file record and sequence number as well as creation times so you can also use the the creation times of the directories as a second factor in verifying that this is in fact the drive they accessed.

Post a Comment


Author Name

Contact Form


Email *

Message *

Powered by Blogger.