@night 1803 access accessdata active directory admissibility ads aduc aim aix ajax alex levinson alissa torres amcache analysis anjp anssi answer key antiforensics apfs appcompat appcompatflags applocker april fools argparse arman gungor arsenal artifact extractor attachments attacker tools austin automating automation awards aws azure azuread back to basics backstage bam base16 best finds beta bias bitcoin bitlocker blackbag blackberry enterprise server blackhat blacklight blade blanche lagny book book review brute force bsides bulk extractor c2 carved carving case ccdc cd burning ceic cfp challenge champlain chat logs Christmas Christmas eve chrome cit client info cloud forensics command line computer forensics computername conference schedule consulting contest cool tools. tips copy and paste coreanalytics cortana court approved credentials cryptocurrency ctf cti summit cut and paste cyberbox Daily Blog dbir deep freeze defcon defender ata deviceclasses dfa dfir dfir automation dfir exposed dfir in 120 seconds dfir indepth dfir review dfir summit dfir wizard dfrws dfvfs dingo stole my baby directories directory dirty file system disablelastaccess discount download dropbox dvd burning e01 elastic search elcomsoft elevated email recovery email searching emdmgmt Encyclopedia Forensica enfuse eric huber es eshandler esxi evalexperience event log event logs evidence execution exfat ext3 ext4 extended mapi external drives f-response factory access mode false positive fat fde firefox for408 for498 for500 for526 for668 forenisc toolkit forensic 4cast forensic lunch forensic soundness forensic tips fraud free fsutil ftk ftk 2 full disk encryption future gcfe gcp github go bag golden ticket google gsuite guardduty gui hackthebox hal pomeranz hashlib hfs honeypot honeypots how does it work how i use it how to howto IE10 imaging incident response indepth information theft infosec pro guide intern internetusername Interview ios ip theft iphone ir itunes encrypted backups jailbreak jeddah jessica hyde joe sylve journals json jump lists kali kape kevin stokes kibana knowledgec korman labs lance mueller last access last logon lateral movement leanpub libtsk libvshadow linux linux forensics linux-3g live systems lnk files log analysis log2timeline login logs london love notes lznt1 mac mac_apt macmini magnet magnet user summit magnet virtual summit mari degrazia mathias fuchs md viewer memorial day memory forensics metaspike mft mftecmd mhn microsoft milestones mimikatz missing features mlocate mobile devices mojave mount mtp multiboot usb mus mus 2019 mus2019 nccdc netanalysis netbios netflow new book new years eve new years resolutions nominations nosql notifications ntfs ntfsdisablelastaccessupdate nuc nw3c objectid offensive forensics office office 2016 office 365 oleg skilkin osx outlook outlook web access owa packetsled paladin pancake viewer path specification pdf perl persistence pfic plists posix powerforensics powerpoint powershell prefetch psexec py2exe pyewf pyinstaller python pytsk rallysecurity raw images rdp re-c re-creation testing reader project recipes recon recursive hashing recycle bin redteam regipy registry registry explorer registry recon regripper remote research reverse engineering rhel rootless runas sample images san diego SANS sans dfir summit sarah edwards saturday Saturday reading sbe sccm scrap files search server 2008 server 2008 r2 server 2012 server 2019 setmace setupapi sha1 shadowkit shadows shell items shellbags shimcache silv3rhorn skull canyon skype slow down smb solution solution saturday sop speed sponsors sqlite srum ssd stage 1 stories storport sunday funday swgde syscache system t2 takeout telemetry temporary files test kitchen thanksgiving threat intel timeline times timestamps timestomp timezone tool tool testing training transaction logs triage triforce truecrypt tsk tun naung tutorial typed paths typedpaths uac unc understanding unicorn unified logs unread updates usb usb detective usbstor user assist userassist usnjrnl validation vhd video video blog videopost vlive vmug vmware volatility vote vss web2.0 webcast webinar webmail weekend reading what are you missing what did they take what don't we know What I wish I knew whitfield windows windows 10 windows 2008 windows 7 windows forensics windows server winfe winfe lite winscp wmi write head xboot xfs xways yarp yogesh zimmerman zone.identifier

Hello Reader,
        If you attended my session at PFIC hopefully you already took these labs with you, if not I'll be linking them down below. For those of who attended my SANS webcast today I hope you found it useful! Now you can try it yourself.

If you didn't attend either I'll explain what's contained within. I presented on how to do USN Journal Analysis using the free version of our tool Triforce ANJP to:
  • Recover the names of wiped files
  • Prove what was uploaded and downloaded from Dropbox
  • Show what attachments were accessed from Outlook 2007 and greater
and more analysis tips. Hopefully you'll find it helpful!

Link to SANS webcast:

First here are the slides from today's webcast:

Link to download the sample evidence to do the labs from today's webcast:

Download Triforce ANJP here:

Hello Reader,
We had a pretty great Forensic Lunch today. We only had one guest but we had enough to talk about to fill the hour and probably another hour in the future.

This week we had Eric Zimmerman, @ericrzimmerman, talking about Shellbags, his tool Shellbag explorer and our research into new things we can determine from them.

We discussed:
  • How shellbags are stored
  • How they are ordered
  • How to manually validate them
  • How to use Eric's tool to visualize them
  • How to determine what file system is being accessed
  • Recovering FTP accesses
  • and much more!

You can download Shellbag Explorer (It's Free!) here: https://www.dropbox.com/s/lw9d0zrzqcr...

You can watch the lunch on Youtube here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dZICx3PV-Q

Or right below: 

Hello Reader,

We had an amazing forensic lunch this week! I hope you spend the time listening to the entire show as I know I learned something from our guests this week.

This week we had:
Matt Bromiley, @505forensics, talking about NoSQL injection attacks and forensics to detect them. You can read more about it on his blog http://www.505forensics.com/

Matt Harrigan, @mattharrigan, of PacketSled, @packetsled, talking about his network visualization tool that is soon to have a free version released. You can sign up for the beta and get this into your hands at http://www.packetsled.com

Also we have a little contest going, with a second contest to follow.

Contest: Leave a comment below to win a free ticket to PFIC,https://www.pfic-conference.com/prime... , and attend my 90 minute USN analysis class. 

Watch the show below:

Hello Reader,
            If you've read this blog you know that I am always looking for new tools and new uses for existing tools to solve all the cases put in front of me. One of the tools I've used for awhile now is Arsenal's Registry Recon to recover deleted registry data and temporary registry data but recently I've been relying a lot of volume shadow copies to get old registries.

Now I know there is way more there and way more ways to use the recovered registry data that I knew before. So here is the scenario, suspect has re-installed Windows on their computer before turning in the computer.    Now I did what you would normally expect, I carved for lnks, ran IEF, recovered USN data but none of that provided me what I really needed to know. Did my suspect take any data with them prior to re-installing. To figure that out, beyond LNK files and jumplists, I usually rely on registry data to determine USB devices connected and shell bags for directory accesses.

I ran registry recon against this image knowing it had support to auto-magically go through all the recovered registry keys and produce a report of previously connected USB devices from recovered registries. I will tell you that it did an amazing job, even after reinstall and slight use i was able to recover over a years worth of USB device connections. So now I knew my suspect had used USB devices... but what did they do with them?

Registry Recon does not allow you to generate a report of the recovered MRU's or Shell bags across all the hives they've recovered, I've talked to them and this is coming in the next release, but I had a directory full of carved registry files.I have other tools I use when I want to go through registry data and some of the recovered hives were quite large and looked like standard registry data, maybe I thought I could just use my normal tools across the recovered hives.

I used the -pipe feature of the TZWorks tools cafae and sbags and passed in the entire set of carved registries and what came back amazed me. Low and behold the recovered registry hives contained a subset that included almost full NTUser hives, system hives and software hives! Using sbags I was able to iterate through all of them and pull out a ton of shell bags data. Using cafae I was able to pull out a ton of MRU and other data! I'm documenting this now so I won't forget later but I do plan to do a step by step to walk through what I did here.

In short, I managed to recover almost all the registry activity I needed from a re-installed system to prove some findings thanks to registry recon. If you have registry recon, and I really do recommend that you do, you can use any third party tool to access the registry data it recovers. In the near future they are updating it again to include even more reports but let's face it just having the data is worth getting a copy today. It's also important to remember that this just doesn't work for re-installed systems. All systems have recoverable temporary registries that may expose data in MRU keys that have rolled over and many other keys.

TLDR; I'm going to get more copies of registry recon and its getting moved up on my tool priority list. 

Hello Reader,
     The current contest ends today 9/16/14 and I've really enjoyed seeing your submissions and watching all of your learn from this. So let's get straight to it:

Current Contest

Level 5 has been beat! I'll be honest I wasn't sure if it was going to happen but I was very impressed by our current leader. To all of you on Level 4 still (Our level 5 winner is also the only person to beat Level 4) you still have until tonight to move on and challenge him for the prize. I'll be calling it end of game tonight around 10pm CST.

If you have questions get an IRC client and come ask them. I'll try to remain in the channel today and late tonight. Other players are in the channel though and you are welcome to talk amongst your selves.

For those of you not playing, or looking for a break here is some more good information.

Forensic Lunch this Friday

Want to know how the winner did it? Want a walk through of each level? Join us Friday at 1pm CST 9/19/14 on the Forensic Lunch when the winner of this challenge will join us to explain how he did it and I will explain exactly what I did for each level. You can watch it here: https://plus.google.com/u/0/b/105962155502598586194/events/cuev3kvm2e464es6kefqrjccob8

Learn Windows Forensics from me!

I'll be co-teaching SANS FOR408 with Rob Lee in Ft. Lauderdale, FL at DFIRCon East Nov 3rd-8th 2014. If you want to spend a week learning everything you can about Windows forensics, and nights going deeper into the artifacts/structures if you want, I can't wait to meet you. As a bonus SANS has put out a $400 coupon for the event, go here to claim it.

Solutions to the past contest

Let's finish off the last challenge with the question that few saw, Stage 5. 

Stage 4 Question:

Hello Forensicator,
Welcome to Stage 5, the final stage. You have until end of your day (wherever in the world you are) on July 6th, 2014 to submit your final answer. The person with best answers from all five stages will then be declared the winner and receive a free vLive class of their choice. Good luck and congratulations on making it this far. Getting this email is an accomplishment in itself, many examiners didn't make it this far. Well done and I hope you continue to follow your passion for DFIR no matter the outcome of this game. This stage will either be easier or incredibly more difficult depending on your time in the OSX world.

Stage 5 Challenge:
You found the MAC address and it came back to an apple computer. Using the security camera footage the police are able to identify three apple computers that where present at the coffee shop during the entire attack period recorded. It's time to see if your knowledge extends across the whole DFIR spectrum with some in depth OSX knowledge, assume this system is running OSX Mavericks: 

1. Two of the OSX systems have the same MAC address, the attacker may have cloned his to fool any possible attempts at detection. Only one of them however connected to the wifi hotspot on the Android phone you identified in Stage 4. How can you determine which system connected to the wifi network.
2. Once you've identified which system was used you need to determine if they accessed the ex-filtrated data. There is a text file that appears to named the same as on you found accessed from the victim system but it now has 0 bytes. How can you determine what its prior contents were.
3. Both of the owners of the systems have stated they are innocent, how can your prove that their system wasn't hijacked by malware.
4. In searching for a bank account number you find a fragment of a file but not the file it came from. How can you re-associate the fragment to the file it originally came from.
can you determine which type of computer connected to the wireless AP 
The Winning Answer:

. I definitely learned a few things on this one.  The last time I had a Mac at work it was Snow Leopard, so the versions issue for #2 was all new, and pretty cool to know about. I look forward to reading the winning answers for these questions.  I am glad to have gotten to the end, held my own, and learn a few things along the way.  It started off innocently enough with Stage 1 and the VSCS question. By the end I felt like I was watching the end of War Games "The only way to win is not to play".

1. Two of the OSX systems have the same MAC address, the attacker may have cloned his to fool any possible attempts at detection. Only one of them however connected to the wifi hotspot on the Android phone you identified in Stage 4. How can you determine which system connected to the wifi network.
If there are two Macs with the same MAC, then you might assume that the person who spoofed their MAC is the bad actor.  You can check the true MAC address of a MAC by removing a few screws (how many depends on the year model of the Mac).  The wireless MAC and Ethernet MAC addresses are generally under the battery area where you will also find the serial number for the Mac.  You can then narrow your search to start examining the most likely Mac to begin with (the one whose Ethernet MAC from the battery label is not the one that shows up on ifconfig output).
At path “private/var/log” The file “system.log” is a Mac’s catch all log for most system activities.  Along with many other things this file can be checked for the name of the SSID and MAC of the Android phone that it connected to when it was set up as a wireless hotspot. There will be a timestamp for the date and time of any connections to the hotspot as well as the IP address that was assigned to this computer, which can be checked against the records on the Android phone for assigning the DHCP lease.
A plist at path: “Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.network.identification.plist” has historical IP assignments with a timestamp for those assignments that can be checked for this issue as well.

2. Once you've identified which system was used you need to determine if they accessed the ex-filtrated data. There is a text file that appears to named the same as on you found accessed from the victim system but it now has 0 bytes. How can you determine what its prior contents were.
From the way this question is worded I assume that it the file was never deleted, and that it was a text file that was modified to remove the content to make it currently 0 bytes. 
If there is no time machine backup for this machine, then I would want to attempt to obtain the previous version of the file by using the “versions” functionality present in Macintosh since Lion version 10.7.  There are databases that Mac uses to track changes to files so that previous versions (I just can’t shake my Windowsness enough to not call them previous versions) can be rolled back to.
At path “/.DocumentRevisions-V100/db-V1/db.sqlite” is a database that tracks file names, paths, and inode for files that have previous versions saved.  That database uses a primary key of “row_id” for file changes to a file.  There is another table that stores information in that database for the change number because OSX is only storing incremental changes and not entire autosaved versions like Time Machine does.
The actual data for the changes of files/previous versions of files is stored at “/.DocumentRevisions-V100/.cs/ChunkStoreDatabase”. If the text file was less than 32KB, then the entire file would be stored as one chunk in the database. The chunks will have to be pieced together from the separate chunks in the database if it is a large file.
Alternatively if the data for the previous version of the file cannot be resolved from the two databases at “/.DocumentRevisions-V100” you can clone the Mac hard drive to another computer then boot it, open the 0 byte file, drop down the arrow next to the file name when it is open and choose to “browse all versions”. You can then open any previous version of the file, and choose to restore any previous version. You may want to double check your work with that method anyhow.

3. Both of the owners of the systems have stated they are innocent, how can your prove that their system wasn't hijacked by malware.
I would start off by examining some log files at “private/var/log”
“Install.log” will show the date, time and name of packages installed on the computer, including OS upgrades, software updates, and new package installations.  It can be checked for the installation of any suspicious binaries.
“System.log” is again our savior for this case as a catch all of things that have been done on the computer.  It can be examined for error messages, remote connections to and from the computer for various application, and activities in the terminal.  I would unpack all of the archived “system.log” files on the computer to put them with the active log then GREP for the terms “sudo” and “USER=root” for starters on seeing lines where an attacker might have dropped into a terminal shell to commit activities.  Older “System.log” files are Gzipped and can be unpacked to be examined if the timeframe of the attack was not in the active “System.log.”
The last 500 entries are stored for terminal usage in the “.bash_history” file at the base of each user’s home directory.
In “System.log” if there is an application on the user’s computer that is making a remote connection to an attacker, then it will be logged for the date, time, and IP address as well as the application making the remote connection out.
Since we know the time of the attack, we can just look through every line of these logs for any activity during that time to determine any remote connections, or suspicious activity.
We can also check to see if the malware was set as an autorun on user login by checking the users “Library/Preferences/com.applie.loginitem.plist” or in the main system we can check for items set to run on system launch as “System/Library/LaunchAgents”. For the launch agents we will have to know a good baseline for normal launch agents and look for suspicious items.

4. In searching for a bank account number you find a fragment of a file but not the file it came from. How can you re-associate the fragment to the file it originally came from.
I would take a note of what cluster number the fragment was found in, then use the TSK tool ifind to find the metadata address (node)for that cluster I would then be able to go to that inode record to determine the file that the data came from. Icat would then be able to be used to view the contents of all data from the file of that node. Istat would be employed to determine information about the file from the node record such as file name, size, type, and CNID. 
If there is trouble with finding what is needed using The Sleuthkit you can always get a bit more manual with the following 6 steps:
1.       1. Take note of the cluster number where the file fragment of interest resides
2.       2. Go to the Catalog file for the file system and search for the “HFSPlusExtentDescriptor” that contains the value “UInt32 – {cluster number where the file fragment of interest was found}”.
3.       3. Back out one level from that HFSPlusExtentDescriptor to view the “HFSPlusForkData record to see the total blocks for the file, and all the other extents for the other file fragments of the file as well as the total size of the file. 
4.       4. Back out one more level from this total file record in the catalog file to view the Catalog Node ID(CNID), Create, Modified, and Access dates for the file as well as other information about the file. 
5.       5. The CNID can be used to locate more information about the file in the “file thread record” area of the Catalog File.  There the CNID can be looked up, and the name of the file as well as the CNID of the parent directory will be available.
6.       6. You could just go nuts and use the “HFSPlusForkData” and “HFSPlusExtentDescriptor” sections to go to all the other fragments of the file to view the contents as well. 

The only answer I needed:

Honestly I needed everything in this winning answer. This answer is what tipped Erik Iker over the scales compared to all the rest of the answers I received. Look over his level of detail and the number of items given for each answer. This is the kind of entry I like to receive as it shows me someone really took the time to test their assumptions with real data rather than just throwing something out there from a google search.

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