@night 1803 access accessdata active directory admissibility ads aduc aim aix ajax alissa torres amcache analysis anjp anssi answer key antiforensics apfs appcompat appcompatflags applocker april fools argparse arman gungor arsenal artifact extractor attachments attacker tools austin automating automation awards aws azure azuread back to basics backstage base16 best finds beta bias bitcoin bitlocker blackbag blackberry enterprise server blackhat blacklight blade blanche lagny book book review brute force bsides bulk extractor c2 carved carving case ccdc cd burning ceic cfp challenge champlain chat logs Christmas Christmas eve chrome cit client info cloud forensics command line computer forensics computername conference schedule consulting contest cool tools. tips copy and paste coreanalytics cortana court approved credentials cryptocurrency ctf cti summit cut and paste cyberbox Daily Blog dbir deep freeze defcon defender ata deviceclasses dfa dfir dfir automation dfir exposed dfir in 120 seconds dfir indepth dfir review dfir summit dfir wizard dfrws dfvfs dingo stole my baby directories directory dirty file system disablelastaccess discount download dropbox dvd burning e01 elastic search elcomsoft elevated email recovery email searching emdmgmt Encyclopedia Forensica enfuse eric huber es eshandler esxi evalexperience event log event logs evidence execution exfat ext3 ext4 extended mapi external drives f-response factory access mode false positive fat fde firefox for408 for498 for500 for526 for668 forenisc toolkit forensic 4cast forensic lunch forensic soundness forensic tips fraud free fsutil ftk ftk 2 full disk encryption future gcfe gcp github go bag golden ticket google gsuite guardduty gui hackthebox hal pomeranz hashlib hfs honeypot honeypots how does it work how i use it how to howto IE10 imaging incident response indepth information theft infosec pro guide intern internetusername Interview ios ip theft iphone ir itunes encrypted backups jailbreak jeddah jessica hyde joe sylve journals json jump lists kali kape kevin stokes kibana knowledgec korman labs lance mueller last access last logon leanpub libtsk libvshadow linux linux-3g live systems lnk files log analysis log2timeline login logs london love notes lznt1 mac mac_apt macmini magnet magnet user summit mathias fuchs md viewer memorial day memory forensics metaspike mft mftecmd mhn microsoft milestones mimikatz missing features mlocate mobile devices mojave mount mtp multiboot usb mus mus 2019 mus2019 nccdc netanalysis netbios netflow new book new years eve new years resolutions nominations nosql notifications ntfs ntfsdisablelastaccessupdate nuc nw3c objectid offensive forensics office office 2016 office 365 oleg skilkin osx outlook outlook web access owa packetsled paladin path specification pdf perl persistence pfic plists posix powerforensics powerpoint powershell prefetch psexec py2exe pyewf pyinstaller python pytsk rallysecurity raw images rdp re-c re-creation testing reader project recipes recon recursive hashing recycle bin redteam regipy registry registry explorer registry recon regripper remote research reverse engineering rhel rootless runas sample images san diego SANS sans dfir summit saturday Saturday reading sbe sccm scrap files search server 2008 server 2008 r2 server 2012 server 2019 setmace setupapi sha1 shadowkit shadows shell items shellbags shimcache silv3rhorn skull canyon skype slow down smb solution solution saturday sop speed sponsors sqlite srum ssd stage 1 stories storport sunday funday swgde syscache system t2 takeout telemetry temporary files test kitchen thanksgiving threat intel timeline times timestamps timestomp timezone tool tool testing training transaction logs triage triforce truecrypt tsk tun naung tutorial typed paths typedpaths uac unc understanding unicorn unified logs unread usb usb detective usbstor user assist userassist usnjrnl validation vhd video video blog videopost vlive vmug vmware volatility vote vss web2.0 webcast webinar webmail weekend reading what are you missing what did they take what don't we know What I wish I knew whitfield windows windows 10 windows 2008 windows 7 windows forensics windows server winfe winfe lite wmi write head xboot xfs xways yarp yogesh zimmerman zone.identifier

Daily Blog #36: Sunday Funday 7/28/13 Winner!

Hello Reader,
                This Sunday Funday I thought was easier than the last and we had several submissions both post on the blog and submitted anonymously but only one was done before the deadline of Midnight PST. o congratulations go out to Jonathan Turner who while not having the most complete answer of all the ones submitted, that goes to Harlan Carvey this week, as he was the only one who submitted his answer before the cutoff!

I got a lot of answers after, do you need me to change the rules to give you more time to play? I thought 24 hours (I try to post at Saturday midnight CST) was enough time, but you need more time to play I can change the rules to let more people participate. I'm hoping as these contests continue we will continue to get great prizes to give away that will tip you over the 'should I try this one' cliff.

Here was the challenge:
The Challenge:     I'm going to step down the difficulty from last week, I may have been asking for a bit much on a Sunday. So this weeks question is going back to basics:
For a Windows 7 system:
Your client has provided you with a forensic image of a laptop computer that was used by an ex-employee at their new employer, it was obtained legally through discovery in a litigation against them. You previously identified that the employee took data when they left where on the system would you look for the following:
1. The same external drive was plugged into both systems
2. What documents were copied onto the system
3. What documents were accessed on the system

Here is Jonathan's answer:
1) The manufacturer, model, and serial number of USB keys plugged into a system are stored in the registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\Control\(CurrentControlSet|ControlSet001|ControlSet002)\Enum\USBSTOR. Comparing these keys on the two systems should show any common devices.
2) The created timestamp on the above registry key can be used to filter a timeline of file creation times to determine what files were added to the system around the time it was plugged in. These files could contain metadata about where they were originally created as well as other interesting information that can be manually collected.
3) Documents accessed on the system should show up in jump lists and (potentially) shellbag information stored in the users' ntuser.dat hive.

 Here is Harlan's answer:
Sorry this is late, but I was at a couple of events yesterday starting at around 2pm...I'm not sending it in so much as a submission, but more to just provide my response...

*1. The same external drive was plugged into both systems

This type of analysis starts with the Enum\USBStor keys.  I would locate the subkey that contained the device identifier for the external drive in question, and see if there is a serial number listed.  If not, that's okay...we have other correlating information available.  If there is a serial number pulled from the device firmware, then we're in luck.  

Beneath the device serial number key, I can get information about when the device was first plugged in, from the LastWrite time to the LogConf key, as well as the Data value (FILETIME time stamp) from the \Properties\{83da6326-97a6-4088-9453-a1923f573b29}\00000065\00000000 subkey.  I would correlate this time with the value in the setupapi.dev.log file, as well as with the first time for that device that I found in the Windows Event Log (for device connection events).    I could then get subsequent connection times via the Windows Event Log, as well as the final connection time from the NTUSER.DAT hive for the user, via the MountPoints2 key (for the device, given the volume GUID from the MountedDevices key) LastWrite time value.  

To be thorough, I would also check beneath the \Enum\WpdBusEnumRoot\UMB key for any volume subkeys whose names contained information (device ID, SN) about the device in question.

Getting the disk signature for the specific external drive can be difficult on Win7, using just the System hive file, as there is very little information to correlate the Enum\USBStor information to the information in the contents of the MountedDevices key.  However, further analysis will be of use, so keep reading.  ;-)

The "\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\EMDMgmt" key in the Software hive contains a good deal of information regarding both USB thumb drives and external drives; the subkeys will be identifiers for devices, and for external drives, you'd be interested in those that do NOT start with "_??USBSTOR".  The subkey names will have an identifier, as well as several underscores (""); if the name is split on underscores, the first to the last item, if there is one, will be the volume name, and the last item will be the volume serial number, listed in decimal format.  This final value changes if the device is reformatted, but it wouldn't make any sense to copy files to the device, reformat, and then connect it to the target device, so we can assume that this information won't change between the two systems.

I could then use this information to correlate to LNK files in the Windows\Recent and Office\Recent folder within the user profile, as well as LNK streams within the user's *.automaticDestinations-ms Jump Lists.

At this point, I will have a drive letter that the external drive was mapped to, so I can then return to the MountedDevices key in the system hive, and by accessing available VSCs, locate one in which the drive letter was available for the ext. drive.  This will provide me with the disk signature of the device itself, as well as the volume GUID.

At this point, I have device identifier, the device serial number, the volume serial number, potentially the disk signature, and the time(s) of when the external drive had been connected to the laptop.  I can then use this information to correlate to the other system.

*2. What documents were copied onto the system

I would create a timeline of system activity, correlating file creation dates on the system with times when device was connected to the system, based on the time-based information provided in the response to #1 above. 

*3. What documents were accessed on the system

The shellbags artifacts likely won't server you much use this time, as on Win7, they tend to not contain the same sort (and volume) of information as they do on WinXP.  However, I would start by looking at the shortcut/LNK files in the user's profile (Windows\Recent and Office\Recent), as well as Jump Lists.  This information also helps us identify the application used to access the documents (Office, Adobe, etc).  I would also, for clarity sake, verify this information via Registry MRUs, even though some of them (ie, RecentDocs) will not contain full path information.  However, now that we have information about the applications used (from the Jump Lists, after performing any required AppID lookups), I would be sure to examine any available application-specific MRUs.

Harlan gave a great answer but didn't get in on time, so the winner of a Specialist Track ticket to PFIC is Jonathan Turner. There is still more to be said on this topic though. I use specific operating systems for a reason as artifacts change between them and there are still artifacts and scenarios not clearly being shown even in both of these answers. When I'm done with the web 2.0 series I'll go into depth on it.

In the mean time, do you want to go to PFIC? I still have more tickets to give away next week. If two answers make it in on time that are both great (or I change the rules based on your feedback to extend the time), I can give away more than one! Tomorrow we resume the web 2.0 series and I hope you follow along as it continues to give me the motivation to keep these up daily! Only 316 more blogs before the year is up!

Post a Comment


Author Name

Contact Form


Email *

Message *

Powered by Blogger.